Panel confirms Japan-U.S. secret pacts, leads to gov’t policy shift
Mar. 10, 2010
by Miya Tanaka
A Foreign Ministry panel concluded Tuesday that secret pacts on nuclear arms and other issues were reached by Japan and the United States in the Cold War era, leading the Japanese government to end its decades-long official denial that any such agreements existed.
With the panel confirming ''a tacit agreement'' that led Tokyo to allow U.S. nuclear-armed vessels to visit Japanese ports, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada said that while Japan's so-called non-nuclear principles may have been violated in the past, there is no such possibility now and Japan will uphold the principles.
Okada said he does not expect the outcome of the panel investigation to affect bilateral security arrangements, which are going through a difficult patch over the issue of relocating a U.S. base in Okinawa.
The expert panel, headed by University of Tokyo professor Shinichi Kitaoka, looked into four alleged secret pacts, including the nuclear weapons deal, and recognized three as secretly reached agreements. Okada told a press conference that in his opinion, the fourth alleged agreement can also be seen as a secret pact.
While the pacts have already been exposed through declassified U.S. documents and other sources, the investigation, launched following the change of government in Japan last year, made clear that previous governments were ''dishonest'' over the issue and raised questions over the management and disclosure of diplomatic documents.
''It is extremely regrettable that this issue has not been revealed to the public...for such a long time,'' Okada said, adding he expects the report ''will contribute to restoring public trust over diplomacy.''
Among the secret pacts acknowledged by the panel was the tacit agreement that emerged during the revision of the Japan-U.S security treaty in 1960, which led Japan effectively to allow port calls by U.S. vessels carrying nuclear weapons without prior consultation.
The prior consultation system required Washington to consult with Tokyo in advance on the ''introduction'' of nuclear weapons, given the strong antinuclear sentiment among the Japanese public following the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.
With the murky aspects of the bilateral security arrangements finally brought to light on the Japanese side, with about 330 documents newly declassified, the report revealed that the non-nuclear principles of not possessing, producing or allowing nuclear weapons on its territory were a mere facade.
Japan had so far said that as prior consultations had never taken place, no nuclear weapons had been brought into Japan. However, Okada effected a change in the official view, saying, ''We cannot clearly state that nuclear weapons were not brought into (Japan).''
In the report, the panel looked into both narrowly and broadly defined secret pacts. Those in a narrow sense are documented, while those in a broad sense, not necessarily backed by papers, were agreed tacitly and have important content differing from official agreements.
Besides the secret nuclear agreement, the panel acknowledged that there was a secret pact that allowed Washington to use U.S. military bases in Japan without prior consultation in the event of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula as well as a pact covering cost burdens for the 1972 reversion of Okinawa to Japan from U.S. control.
But it said another alleged pact to allow Washington to bring nuclear weapons into Okinawa in times of emergency does not fit the definitions of a secret pact as it is unlikely that it goes far beyond the content of the 1969 Japan-U.S. statement on the Okinawa reversion.
As for the secret nuclear deal, the panel concluded that, at the time of revising their security treaty, Japan and United States ''intentionally'' avoided further pursuing whether the entry of U.S. vessels into Japanese ports would be subject to prior consultations so as not to disrupt their alliance.
''By leaving the issue ambiguous, (U.S.) ships carrying nuclear weapons could stop at Japanese ports without prior consultation, while Japan, as its official stance, could deny such a development. But neither side would make a protest,'' the report noted.
Such a tacit agreement, or ''secret pact in a broad sense,'' became fixed after U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin Reischauer told Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira in 1963 that Washington did not consider the port calls as subject to prior consultation.
While aware of the high probability that U.S. nuclear-armed ships might visit its ports, Japan did not make any protests and continued to explain to the Diet that port calls would be subject to prior consultation, according to the report.
''The Japanese government offered dishonest explanations, including lies, from beginning to end. This attitude should not have been allowed under the principle of democracy,'' the panel said.
But the panel also pointed out it was not easy in those days to achieve a balance ''between a nuclear deterrence strategy under the Cold War era and the Japanese people's antinuclear sentiments.''
The report noted that following U.S. President George H.W. Bush's post-Cold War announcement in 1991 that the United States would withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from its vessels, the port call issue no longer troubles Japan-U.S. ties.
Referring to the U.S. policy, Okada said, ''Thus, after 1991, I don't think nuclear weapons would be brought in in the form of port calls.''
On an agreement that allowed Washington to use U.S. military bases in Japan in the event of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula, the panel said that while it found a document proving its existence, it is no longer in effect.
On the cost burden related to the Okinawa reversion, the panel said a secret pact in a broad sense can be confirmed, under which Tokyo gave consent to shouldering $4 million in costs the United States was supposed to pay to restore to their original state Okinawa land plots that U.S. forces had used.
Meanwhile, the panel proposed the ministry consider ways to ensure that it follows its basic policy of disclosing 30-year-old diplomatic documents -- for example, by assigning more staff to handle the task.
It also labeled as undesirable the situation whereby, for a long period, accounts of Japan's diplomatic history are found mainly in the records of other countries.
Okada said that he had decided to set up a task force on disclosure and management of diplomatic records and would like to consider measures to improve the situation.
The expert report also expressed regret that many key documents were found to be missing, and called for further investigations amid a media report that there was an internal order at the ministry to dispose of some documents related to the secret nuclear pact.
(Distributed by Kyodo News on March 10, 2010)
A Foreign Ministry panel concluded Tuesday that secret pacts on nuclear arms and other issues were reached by Japan and the United States in the Cold War era, leading the Japanese government to end its decades-long official denial that any such agreements existed.
With the panel confirming ''a tacit agreement'' that led Tokyo to allow U.S. nuclear-armed vessels to visit Japanese ports, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada said that while Japan's so-called non-nuclear principles may have been violated in the past, there is no such possibility now and Japan will uphold the principles.
Okada said he does not expect the outcome of the panel investigation to affect bilateral security arrangements, which are going through a difficult patch over the issue of relocating a U.S. base in Okinawa.
The expert panel, headed by University of Tokyo professor Shinichi Kitaoka, looked into four alleged secret pacts, including the nuclear weapons deal, and recognized three as secretly reached agreements. Okada told a press conference that in his opinion, the fourth alleged agreement can also be seen as a secret pact.
While the pacts have already been exposed through declassified U.S. documents and other sources, the investigation, launched following the change of government in Japan last year, made clear that previous governments were ''dishonest'' over the issue and raised questions over the management and disclosure of diplomatic documents.
''It is extremely regrettable that this issue has not been revealed to the public...for such a long time,'' Okada said, adding he expects the report ''will contribute to restoring public trust over diplomacy.''
Among the secret pacts acknowledged by the panel was the tacit agreement that emerged during the revision of the Japan-U.S security treaty in 1960, which led Japan effectively to allow port calls by U.S. vessels carrying nuclear weapons without prior consultation.
The prior consultation system required Washington to consult with Tokyo in advance on the ''introduction'' of nuclear weapons, given the strong antinuclear sentiment among the Japanese public following the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.
With the murky aspects of the bilateral security arrangements finally brought to light on the Japanese side, with about 330 documents newly declassified, the report revealed that the non-nuclear principles of not possessing, producing or allowing nuclear weapons on its territory were a mere facade.
Japan had so far said that as prior consultations had never taken place, no nuclear weapons had been brought into Japan. However, Okada effected a change in the official view, saying, ''We cannot clearly state that nuclear weapons were not brought into (Japan).''
In the report, the panel looked into both narrowly and broadly defined secret pacts. Those in a narrow sense are documented, while those in a broad sense, not necessarily backed by papers, were agreed tacitly and have important content differing from official agreements.
Besides the secret nuclear agreement, the panel acknowledged that there was a secret pact that allowed Washington to use U.S. military bases in Japan without prior consultation in the event of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula as well as a pact covering cost burdens for the 1972 reversion of Okinawa to Japan from U.S. control.
But it said another alleged pact to allow Washington to bring nuclear weapons into Okinawa in times of emergency does not fit the definitions of a secret pact as it is unlikely that it goes far beyond the content of the 1969 Japan-U.S. statement on the Okinawa reversion.
As for the secret nuclear deal, the panel concluded that, at the time of revising their security treaty, Japan and United States ''intentionally'' avoided further pursuing whether the entry of U.S. vessels into Japanese ports would be subject to prior consultations so as not to disrupt their alliance.
''By leaving the issue ambiguous, (U.S.) ships carrying nuclear weapons could stop at Japanese ports without prior consultation, while Japan, as its official stance, could deny such a development. But neither side would make a protest,'' the report noted.
Such a tacit agreement, or ''secret pact in a broad sense,'' became fixed after U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin Reischauer told Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira in 1963 that Washington did not consider the port calls as subject to prior consultation.
While aware of the high probability that U.S. nuclear-armed ships might visit its ports, Japan did not make any protests and continued to explain to the Diet that port calls would be subject to prior consultation, according to the report.
''The Japanese government offered dishonest explanations, including lies, from beginning to end. This attitude should not have been allowed under the principle of democracy,'' the panel said.
But the panel also pointed out it was not easy in those days to achieve a balance ''between a nuclear deterrence strategy under the Cold War era and the Japanese people's antinuclear sentiments.''
The report noted that following U.S. President George H.W. Bush's post-Cold War announcement in 1991 that the United States would withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from its vessels, the port call issue no longer troubles Japan-U.S. ties.
Referring to the U.S. policy, Okada said, ''Thus, after 1991, I don't think nuclear weapons would be brought in in the form of port calls.''
On an agreement that allowed Washington to use U.S. military bases in Japan in the event of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula, the panel said that while it found a document proving its existence, it is no longer in effect.
On the cost burden related to the Okinawa reversion, the panel said a secret pact in a broad sense can be confirmed, under which Tokyo gave consent to shouldering $4 million in costs the United States was supposed to pay to restore to their original state Okinawa land plots that U.S. forces had used.
Meanwhile, the panel proposed the ministry consider ways to ensure that it follows its basic policy of disclosing 30-year-old diplomatic documents -- for example, by assigning more staff to handle the task.
It also labeled as undesirable the situation whereby, for a long period, accounts of Japan's diplomatic history are found mainly in the records of other countries.
Okada said that he had decided to set up a task force on disclosure and management of diplomatic records and would like to consider measures to improve the situation.
The expert report also expressed regret that many key documents were found to be missing, and called for further investigations amid a media report that there was an internal order at the ministry to dispose of some documents related to the secret nuclear pact.
(Distributed by Kyodo News on March 10, 2010)
