Editorial: As A-bombed nation, Japan should not conclude nuclear agreement with India
Jun. 7, 2017
The nuclear agreement between Japan and India, which will pave the way for Japan to export its nuclear power plant technology and facilities to India, will soon be finalized and go into effect.
The agreement has already been approved by the Lower House and yesterday was approved by a committee of the Upper House, where it will likely pass in a plenary session today. However, because this agreement can potentially have an enormous impact on global conditions involving nuclear weapons, the danger it presents must not be accepted without resistance.
India is a non-member nation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), nor has it signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). So it is possible that India could conduct another nuclear test in the future. If that transpires, could this nuclear agreement be suspended? What action will be taken by the Japanese government if India carries out a subcritical nuclear test?
In response to such concerns that have been voiced by opponents of the agreement, the Japanese government seems to have sought to offer ambiguous answers, wanting only to expedite the export of nuclear power plants. Why is the government turning a blind eye to this risk of contributing to nuclear proliferation?
When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Japan last November, Mr. Modi and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe signed the agreement. It contains provisions which will allow Japan to transfer its nuclear materials and nuclear energy technology to India.
Currently, there are more than 20 nuclear power plants operating in India. Due to the high demand for electricity, it is said that India will increase the capacity of its nuclear energy by 10 times the current output by the year 2032.
The agreement has drawn the attention of the nuclear power plant industry in Japan, which has cooled off since the accident at the Fukushima No. 1 (Daiichi) nuclear power plant. Though the government may want to support Japanese manufacturers of nuclear power plants by realizing this agreement, manufacturers like Toshiba, which is now in deep financial difficulty, are, in reality, reportedly unable to handle large-scale exports of this kind. It is hard to understand why the government is so aggressive in its efforts to conclude the agreement.
Concerns and suspicions about nuclear energy have also been growing among the people of India, sparking protests and opposition movements in various regions. From a moral perspective, too, this situation should not be ignored.
In addition, India and Pakistan, India’s neighbor, have had a hostile relationship over territorial and other issues for a long time. These two nations are also competitors in a nuclear arms race, which means there is the danger that Japanese nuclear energy technology could be diverted to military use.
After the agreement was approved in the plenary session of the Lower House on May 16, discussion has been taking place in the Upper House committee, on diplomatic and defense matters, since May 30.
When asked, in this debate, about the risk of nuclear proliferation, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida said, “With this agreement, we will be able to bring India to the NPT, virtually.”
The agreement stipulates that neither Japanese nuclear materials nor its technology will be used for the development of nuclear explosive devices, and that India will accept inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). But it cannot be said that these provisions are sufficient.
It is understandable that the opposition party has been defiant, arguing that “The agreement will instead strengthen India’s position as a nuclear nation.”
Mr. Kishida stressed that the agreement would be terminated if India resumes nuclear testing. But this has been agreed by the two nations only in the associated documents and is not included in the body of the main agreement. There is no guarantee that such provisions could stop the operation of India’s nuclear power plants. In the event of a subcritical nuclear test, which does not produce a nuclear explosion, the agreement does not clearly refer to a suspension of these terms, but only states that an appropriate action would be taken.
The agreement also approves the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. The government argues that plutonium, which is generated as a result of reprocessing the used fuel, will be monitored and inspected by the IAEA. But that material may even help India expand its development of nuclear weapons.
If the agreement is suspended, the Japanese government would retrieve the used nuclear fuel at the nation’s expense. Under that scenario, the government would have to assume the risk of transporting plutonium from India to Japan, and securing it safely. Then Japan, a nation which has already stored about 48 tons of plutonium, would come under greater pressure from other nations.
The agreement still leaves many questions unanswered. That the agreement could be concluded without any additional resolutions, which would strictly safeguard against nuclear development, is completely unacceptable. This agreement goes against the people’s desire for nuclear abolition, too. As the nation which experienced the atomic bombings, Japan should not conclude a nuclear agreement of this kind.
(Originally published on June 7, 2017)
The agreement has already been approved by the Lower House and yesterday was approved by a committee of the Upper House, where it will likely pass in a plenary session today. However, because this agreement can potentially have an enormous impact on global conditions involving nuclear weapons, the danger it presents must not be accepted without resistance.
India is a non-member nation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), nor has it signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). So it is possible that India could conduct another nuclear test in the future. If that transpires, could this nuclear agreement be suspended? What action will be taken by the Japanese government if India carries out a subcritical nuclear test?
In response to such concerns that have been voiced by opponents of the agreement, the Japanese government seems to have sought to offer ambiguous answers, wanting only to expedite the export of nuclear power plants. Why is the government turning a blind eye to this risk of contributing to nuclear proliferation?
When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Japan last November, Mr. Modi and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe signed the agreement. It contains provisions which will allow Japan to transfer its nuclear materials and nuclear energy technology to India.
Currently, there are more than 20 nuclear power plants operating in India. Due to the high demand for electricity, it is said that India will increase the capacity of its nuclear energy by 10 times the current output by the year 2032.
The agreement has drawn the attention of the nuclear power plant industry in Japan, which has cooled off since the accident at the Fukushima No. 1 (Daiichi) nuclear power plant. Though the government may want to support Japanese manufacturers of nuclear power plants by realizing this agreement, manufacturers like Toshiba, which is now in deep financial difficulty, are, in reality, reportedly unable to handle large-scale exports of this kind. It is hard to understand why the government is so aggressive in its efforts to conclude the agreement.
Concerns and suspicions about nuclear energy have also been growing among the people of India, sparking protests and opposition movements in various regions. From a moral perspective, too, this situation should not be ignored.
In addition, India and Pakistan, India’s neighbor, have had a hostile relationship over territorial and other issues for a long time. These two nations are also competitors in a nuclear arms race, which means there is the danger that Japanese nuclear energy technology could be diverted to military use.
After the agreement was approved in the plenary session of the Lower House on May 16, discussion has been taking place in the Upper House committee, on diplomatic and defense matters, since May 30.
When asked, in this debate, about the risk of nuclear proliferation, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida said, “With this agreement, we will be able to bring India to the NPT, virtually.”
The agreement stipulates that neither Japanese nuclear materials nor its technology will be used for the development of nuclear explosive devices, and that India will accept inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). But it cannot be said that these provisions are sufficient.
It is understandable that the opposition party has been defiant, arguing that “The agreement will instead strengthen India’s position as a nuclear nation.”
Mr. Kishida stressed that the agreement would be terminated if India resumes nuclear testing. But this has been agreed by the two nations only in the associated documents and is not included in the body of the main agreement. There is no guarantee that such provisions could stop the operation of India’s nuclear power plants. In the event of a subcritical nuclear test, which does not produce a nuclear explosion, the agreement does not clearly refer to a suspension of these terms, but only states that an appropriate action would be taken.
The agreement also approves the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. The government argues that plutonium, which is generated as a result of reprocessing the used fuel, will be monitored and inspected by the IAEA. But that material may even help India expand its development of nuclear weapons.
If the agreement is suspended, the Japanese government would retrieve the used nuclear fuel at the nation’s expense. Under that scenario, the government would have to assume the risk of transporting plutonium from India to Japan, and securing it safely. Then Japan, a nation which has already stored about 48 tons of plutonium, would come under greater pressure from other nations.
The agreement still leaves many questions unanswered. That the agreement could be concluded without any additional resolutions, which would strictly safeguard against nuclear development, is completely unacceptable. This agreement goes against the people’s desire for nuclear abolition, too. As the nation which experienced the atomic bombings, Japan should not conclude a nuclear agreement of this kind.
(Originally published on June 7, 2017)
