Japan says failed to act swiftly in nuclear crisis
Jun. 8, 2011
Japan said Tuesday in a report to the International Atomic Energy Agency that its nuclear regulatory system failed to deal swiftly with the ongoing crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant and it will spin off its nuclear safety agency from the industry ministry.
The report compiled for an IAEA nuclear safety meeting in Vienna later this month also said the country was not fully prepared for accidents that could inflict serious damage to reactor cores at the nuclear power station in the country's northeast.
The report also touched on insufficient communication between the government and the plant's operator, Tokyo Electric Power Co., at the early stage of Japan's worst nuclear power plant crisis.
''We are taking very seriously the fact...that consistent preparation for severe accidents was insufficient. In light of the lessons learned from the accident, Japan has recognized that a fundamental revision of its nuclear safety preparedness and response is inevitable,'' the government nuclear emergency response headquarters said in an outline of the report.
Prime Minister Naoto Kan told a headquarters meeting that reporting about the accident with ''thorough transparency'' will be key to restoring international trust in Japan.
The report also called for holding public discussions on the future course of nuclear power by disclosing the level of costs necessary for securing the safety of atomic power generation.
Starting with ''sincere regret'' for causing anxiety to people around the world over the release of radioactive materials from the plant, the report explained that the Nos. 1 to 3 reactors at the plant have all suffered ''core melt,'' referring to the possibility that melted fuel had damaged the bottom of the reactors' pressure vessels and partially accumulated in the outer primary containers.
As one of the lessons learned from the accident, the report stressed that the existence of various entities left unclear where primary responsibility for ensuring citizens' safety in an emergency resided and it cannot be denied that ''the existing organizations and structures made mobilization of capabilities difficult to promptly respond to such a large-scale nuclear accident.''
''Reflecting on the above issues, the Japanese government will separate NISA from METI'' and start to ''review implementing frameworks...for administration on nuclear safety regulation,'' it said.
NISA stands for the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, while METI refers to the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, which has been pushing the country's nuclear power policy.
There has been criticism of the lack of organizational separation between the promoter of nuclear power and safety regulators, and the IAEA also pointed to the importance of ensuring the independence of nuclear regulatory authorities in a preliminary assessment of the Fukushima nuclear crisis recently submitted to Japan.
METI chief Banri Kaieda told a news conference later in the day that work to consider how to unify the separated nuclear agency with other nuclear regulatory bodies would start ''immediately.''
In stark contrast to the time before the nuclear crisis, when Japan boasted of possessing the world's safest nuclear power plants, the report cited many points that should be reflected upon, including inadequate measures against large-scale tsunami and the failure to prevent a series of hydrogen explosions inside the reactor buildings.
As for the radiation exposure of workers engaging in restoration work at the Fukushima plant, the report said around 7,800 workers had entered the area as of May 23 with an average exposure dose of 7.7 millisieverts.
But it also said that measurement of their internal exposure has been delayed and ''a certain number'' of workers may have been exposed to over 250 millisieverts, the maximum radiation dose limit set specifically for workers dealing with the crisis.
Hit by the magnitude 9.0 earthquake and tsunami waves more than 14 meters high on March 11, the six-reactor nuclear complex lost nearly all of its power sources, leading the cooling functions of the reactors and spent nuclear fuel pools at the Nos. 1 to 4 units to fail.
It is believed that the fuel inside is being kept cool by water injected from outside as an emergency measure.
Goshi Hosono, a special adviser to Kan on the nuclear accident, said that he spent the past month compiling the report ahead of the IAEA ministerial conference to be held between June 20 and 24.
(Distributed by Kyodo News on June 8, 2011)
The report compiled for an IAEA nuclear safety meeting in Vienna later this month also said the country was not fully prepared for accidents that could inflict serious damage to reactor cores at the nuclear power station in the country's northeast.
The report also touched on insufficient communication between the government and the plant's operator, Tokyo Electric Power Co., at the early stage of Japan's worst nuclear power plant crisis.
''We are taking very seriously the fact...that consistent preparation for severe accidents was insufficient. In light of the lessons learned from the accident, Japan has recognized that a fundamental revision of its nuclear safety preparedness and response is inevitable,'' the government nuclear emergency response headquarters said in an outline of the report.
Prime Minister Naoto Kan told a headquarters meeting that reporting about the accident with ''thorough transparency'' will be key to restoring international trust in Japan.
The report also called for holding public discussions on the future course of nuclear power by disclosing the level of costs necessary for securing the safety of atomic power generation.
Starting with ''sincere regret'' for causing anxiety to people around the world over the release of radioactive materials from the plant, the report explained that the Nos. 1 to 3 reactors at the plant have all suffered ''core melt,'' referring to the possibility that melted fuel had damaged the bottom of the reactors' pressure vessels and partially accumulated in the outer primary containers.
As one of the lessons learned from the accident, the report stressed that the existence of various entities left unclear where primary responsibility for ensuring citizens' safety in an emergency resided and it cannot be denied that ''the existing organizations and structures made mobilization of capabilities difficult to promptly respond to such a large-scale nuclear accident.''
''Reflecting on the above issues, the Japanese government will separate NISA from METI'' and start to ''review implementing frameworks...for administration on nuclear safety regulation,'' it said.
NISA stands for the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, while METI refers to the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, which has been pushing the country's nuclear power policy.
There has been criticism of the lack of organizational separation between the promoter of nuclear power and safety regulators, and the IAEA also pointed to the importance of ensuring the independence of nuclear regulatory authorities in a preliminary assessment of the Fukushima nuclear crisis recently submitted to Japan.
METI chief Banri Kaieda told a news conference later in the day that work to consider how to unify the separated nuclear agency with other nuclear regulatory bodies would start ''immediately.''
In stark contrast to the time before the nuclear crisis, when Japan boasted of possessing the world's safest nuclear power plants, the report cited many points that should be reflected upon, including inadequate measures against large-scale tsunami and the failure to prevent a series of hydrogen explosions inside the reactor buildings.
As for the radiation exposure of workers engaging in restoration work at the Fukushima plant, the report said around 7,800 workers had entered the area as of May 23 with an average exposure dose of 7.7 millisieverts.
But it also said that measurement of their internal exposure has been delayed and ''a certain number'' of workers may have been exposed to over 250 millisieverts, the maximum radiation dose limit set specifically for workers dealing with the crisis.
Hit by the magnitude 9.0 earthquake and tsunami waves more than 14 meters high on March 11, the six-reactor nuclear complex lost nearly all of its power sources, leading the cooling functions of the reactors and spent nuclear fuel pools at the Nos. 1 to 4 units to fail.
It is believed that the fuel inside is being kept cool by water injected from outside as an emergency measure.
Goshi Hosono, a special adviser to Kan on the nuclear accident, said that he spent the past month compiling the report ahead of the IAEA ministerial conference to be held between June 20 and 24.
(Distributed by Kyodo News on June 8, 2011)
