Editorial: Japan-U.S. Civil Nuclear Agreement
Jun. 22, 2017
We should first abandon the nuclear reprocessing policy
The Japan-U.S. Nuclear Agreement is scheduled to end in July 2018. Under this agreement, Japan is provided with enriched uranium and nuclear technology, but in exchange, it accepts restrictions on the handling of nuclear-related equipment and nuclear materials to prevent nuclear proliferation.
The agreement permits Japan, as an exceptional case, to reprocess spent nuclear fuel generated from nuclear power plants, although reprocessing by non-nuclear nations is essentially not allowed. Japan had made a plan to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel and reuse the extracted plutonium, but this plan has yet to be realized. Before considering the future of the Japan-U.S. Nuclear Agreement, the government needs to review the country’s nuclear energy policy, including the reprocessing and nuclear fuel cycle.
Fast-breeder reactors, in particular, were once used to be referred to as “dream reactors” because, in theory, they produce more plutonium which can be used as fuel while in operation. However, the prototype fast-breeder reactor Monju, which operated only briefly, will be decommissioned. If it had been put into practical use, energy resources, for which Japan usually relies on imports, could have been produced domestically. As hardly any countries have succeeded in operating fast-breeder reactors on a commercial basis, it would seem that the idea has effectively collapsed.
The failure of Monju has resulted in Japan accumulating enough plutonium to be usable in nuclear weapons. Japan now stockpiles an excessive amount of useless plutonium and the international community suspects that Japan has the potential to arm itself with nuclear weapons at any time. Japan must be on full alert so that it does not become the target of terrorist attacks.
After 1988, when the Japan-U.S. Nuclear Agreement came into force, the Cold War ended and, since then, international conditions involving nuclear use have changed considerably. With nuclear tests conducted by India, Pakistan, and North Korea that could not be prevented, nuclear proliferation is now a deep concern of the international community. Furthermore, the nuclear accidents that occurred at the Chernobyl power plant in the former Soviet Union and at the Fukushima No. 1 (Daiichi) nuclear power plant in Japan, operated by the Tokyo Electric Power Company, are considered to be the world’s worst nuclear plant accidents.
Many nations are taking the consequences of these accidents seriously, with some changing their energy policies by gradually phasing out the use of nuclear energy. Japan should also consider the dire events that have taken place both in Japan and elsewhere in the world over the past 30 years, and reexamine and review the necessity of the Japan-U.S. Nuclear Agreement and the country’s nuclear energy policy.
It would seem, however, that the Japanese government remains unprepared for such a review. It is believed that the government is following a policy of renewing the agreement automatically without an expiration date. However, if either party notifies the other to that effect in writing, the agreement will end in six months. On the other hand, if either party chooses a long-term extension of the agreement or any major modifications to the agreement, the governments must undertake a more complicated process, such as engaging in bilateral negotiations and obtaining approval from lawmakers.
When the 1988 Japan-U.S. Nuclear Agreement was concluded, there was opposition in the U.S. Congress because of nuclear proliferation concerns and the potential dangers associated with the transportation of plutonium, which made it difficult to obtain the approval of lawmakers there. In the United States there are still some who are strongly against the idea of reprocessing due to the concern of nuclear proliferation. Japan now holds some 48 tons of stockpiled plutonium, which is enough to make 6,000 nuclear bombs. Under these current circumstances, it could be far more difficult to obtain approval from the U.S. Congress.
Under the Trump administration, the State Department, the Department of Energy, and various other related departments are still not fully prepared to perform their functions. For this reason, it would be hard for the Japanese government to engage in any serious negotiations with their U.S. counterparts. But if the Japanese government attempts to use this as an excuse to avoid discussions concerning the plutonium-related issues for which Japan has received substantial criticism from the international community, such a stance is not acceptable.
In Japan, transparency is required in negotiations with the United States, but before those negotiations take place, the government should first think about the technical feasibility and economic efficiency of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel and operating fast-breed reactors and for what purpose they are needed. The government must also grapple with the issue of nuclear waste. These basic issues should be discussed first before renewing the agreement.
(Originally published on June 22, 2017)
The Japan-U.S. Nuclear Agreement is scheduled to end in July 2018. Under this agreement, Japan is provided with enriched uranium and nuclear technology, but in exchange, it accepts restrictions on the handling of nuclear-related equipment and nuclear materials to prevent nuclear proliferation.
The agreement permits Japan, as an exceptional case, to reprocess spent nuclear fuel generated from nuclear power plants, although reprocessing by non-nuclear nations is essentially not allowed. Japan had made a plan to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel and reuse the extracted plutonium, but this plan has yet to be realized. Before considering the future of the Japan-U.S. Nuclear Agreement, the government needs to review the country’s nuclear energy policy, including the reprocessing and nuclear fuel cycle.
Fast-breeder reactors, in particular, were once used to be referred to as “dream reactors” because, in theory, they produce more plutonium which can be used as fuel while in operation. However, the prototype fast-breeder reactor Monju, which operated only briefly, will be decommissioned. If it had been put into practical use, energy resources, for which Japan usually relies on imports, could have been produced domestically. As hardly any countries have succeeded in operating fast-breeder reactors on a commercial basis, it would seem that the idea has effectively collapsed.
The failure of Monju has resulted in Japan accumulating enough plutonium to be usable in nuclear weapons. Japan now stockpiles an excessive amount of useless plutonium and the international community suspects that Japan has the potential to arm itself with nuclear weapons at any time. Japan must be on full alert so that it does not become the target of terrorist attacks.
After 1988, when the Japan-U.S. Nuclear Agreement came into force, the Cold War ended and, since then, international conditions involving nuclear use have changed considerably. With nuclear tests conducted by India, Pakistan, and North Korea that could not be prevented, nuclear proliferation is now a deep concern of the international community. Furthermore, the nuclear accidents that occurred at the Chernobyl power plant in the former Soviet Union and at the Fukushima No. 1 (Daiichi) nuclear power plant in Japan, operated by the Tokyo Electric Power Company, are considered to be the world’s worst nuclear plant accidents.
Many nations are taking the consequences of these accidents seriously, with some changing their energy policies by gradually phasing out the use of nuclear energy. Japan should also consider the dire events that have taken place both in Japan and elsewhere in the world over the past 30 years, and reexamine and review the necessity of the Japan-U.S. Nuclear Agreement and the country’s nuclear energy policy.
It would seem, however, that the Japanese government remains unprepared for such a review. It is believed that the government is following a policy of renewing the agreement automatically without an expiration date. However, if either party notifies the other to that effect in writing, the agreement will end in six months. On the other hand, if either party chooses a long-term extension of the agreement or any major modifications to the agreement, the governments must undertake a more complicated process, such as engaging in bilateral negotiations and obtaining approval from lawmakers.
When the 1988 Japan-U.S. Nuclear Agreement was concluded, there was opposition in the U.S. Congress because of nuclear proliferation concerns and the potential dangers associated with the transportation of plutonium, which made it difficult to obtain the approval of lawmakers there. In the United States there are still some who are strongly against the idea of reprocessing due to the concern of nuclear proliferation. Japan now holds some 48 tons of stockpiled plutonium, which is enough to make 6,000 nuclear bombs. Under these current circumstances, it could be far more difficult to obtain approval from the U.S. Congress.
Under the Trump administration, the State Department, the Department of Energy, and various other related departments are still not fully prepared to perform their functions. For this reason, it would be hard for the Japanese government to engage in any serious negotiations with their U.S. counterparts. But if the Japanese government attempts to use this as an excuse to avoid discussions concerning the plutonium-related issues for which Japan has received substantial criticism from the international community, such a stance is not acceptable.
In Japan, transparency is required in negotiations with the United States, but before those negotiations take place, the government should first think about the technical feasibility and economic efficiency of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel and operating fast-breed reactors and for what purpose they are needed. The government must also grapple with the issue of nuclear waste. These basic issues should be discussed first before renewing the agreement.
(Originally published on June 22, 2017)
